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 Non-technical Summary 
The study of the innovative output of firms often relies on a count of patents filed at one 
single patent office, although companies have the option to file patents at multiple offices 
such as their national patent office, the European Patent office (EPO), the World Intellectual 
Property Office, the US Patent and Trademark Office, or in any other jurisdiction. In Europe, 
the office of reference used is often the EPO. Yet, not all firms file their patents at the EPO, 
raising the specter of a selection bias.  
Motivated by the tension between the popularity of the single office count and the 
threat of a selection bias, the objective of this paper is twofold. First, we study whether the 
single-office count biases econometric estimates of innovation production functions. 
Innovation production functions, which relate a firm’s inventive input to its output, are a key 
object of analysis in the innovation literature. Second, we propose a simple way to test the 
existence of bias when the econometrician observes patents at only one patent office.  
The analysis is performed on a panel of Belgian patenting firms. Three databases are 
combined: The panel of R&D surveys providing annual data on R&D-related variables for 
the period 2002–2008 is merged with the Belfirst database which provides yearly information 
on balance sheets and income statements. The Patstat database by the EPO (April 2009 
edition) was used to collect a novel dataset of the whole population of patents by Belgian 
firms. 
We show that the single-office count results in a selection bias that affects 
econometric estimates of innovation production functions. In addition, we demonstrate the 
usefulness of our test to evaluate whether estimates that rely on the single-office count are 
affected by a selection bias. The test, which uses information that is readily available to most 
researchers, successfully spots variables that are subject to a selection bias. It should be of 
interest to a wide audience given its ease of use and the popularity of the single-office count 
among innovation scholars. 
 
 
  
 
 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Studien, die Innovationen von Unternehmen untersuchen, stützen sich häufig auf die Zahl der 
Patentanmeldungen eines einzigen Patentamtes, obwohl Unternehmen die Möglichkeit haben 
ein Patent an mehreren Patentämtern zu melden, wie beispielsweise dem nationalen 
Patentamt, dem Europäischen Patentamt (EPA), dem World Intellectual Property Office, dem 
US Patentamt oder anderen Patentämtern. Da nicht alle Unternehmen ein Patent beim EPA 
anmelden, kann dies bei der Zählung der Patentanmeldungen beim EPA zu einer 
Selektionsverzerrung führen. 
Diese Studie untersucht deshalb erstens, ob die einfache Zählung der 
Patentanmeldungen an nur einem Patentamt die ökonometrische Schätzung von 
Innovationsproduktionsfunktionen verzerrt. Denn Innovationsproduktionsfunktionen, die das 
Verhältnis von Mitteleinsatz und Ergebnis des Innovationsprozesses aufzeigen, stehen im 
Fokus der Innovationsliteratur. Zweitens, stellen wir einen einfachen Weg vor, um auf die 
Existenz einer möglichen Verzerrung zu testen, falls Analysen lediglich die 
Patentanmeldungen eines einzelnen Patentamtes zugrunde liegen. 
Die Analyse beruht auf einem Paneldatensatz patentierender Unternehmen in Belgien. 
Zu diesem Zwecke wurden drei Datenbanken miteinander kombiniert: Das belgische 
Innovationspanel, das jährlich Firmen zu ihrer Forschung- und Entwicklungstätigkeit befragt, 
die Belfirst Datenbank vom Büro van Dijk, welche Finanzdaten der Firmen enthält, sowie die 
Patstat Datenbank des EPA (Ausgabe April 2009), welche alle Patentanmeldungen belgischer 
Unternehmen verzeichnet. 
Die Analyse weist auf, dass die Zählung von Patentanmeldungen eines einzigen 
Patentamtes zu einer Selektionsverzerrung führt, die sich auf die Schätzergebnisse der 
Innovationsproduktionsfunktion auswirkt. Zudem zeigt sich, dass der Test auf mögliche 
Verzerrung der Schätzergebnisse, angewendet werden kann, um zu prüfen, ob die Nutzung 
der Patentanmeldungen lediglich eines Patentamtes die Schätzergebnisse verzerrt. Der Test 
basiert auf einfach zugänglichen Informationen und kann erfolgreich einzelne Variablen 
identifizieren, die durch die Selektion verzerrt werden. Aufgrund der einfachen Anwendung 
des von uns vorgeschlagenen Tests und der großen Beliebtheit der Analyse auf Basis von 
Patentanmeldungen eines einzelnen Patentamtes, gehen wir davon aus, dass unsere 
Ergebnisse auf das Interesse einer breiten Leserschaft treffen.  
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Abstract 
The study of the innovative output of firms often relies on a count of 
patents filed at one single office of reference such as the European 
Patent Office (EPO). Yet, not all firms file their patents at the EPO, 
raising the specter of a selection bias. Using a novel dataset of the 
whole population of patents by Belgian firms, we show that the single-
office count results in a selection bias that affects econometric 
estimates of innovation production functions. We propose a 
methodology to evaluate whether estimates that rely on the single-
office count are affected by a selection bias.  
 
JEL Codes: O31, C18, C52, C81 
Keywords: innovation production function, patent, R&D, selection 
bias 
 
  
1 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Economic and management research on innovation has greatly benefited from the increased 
availability of patent data, which provide a unique way of tracking the creation and the 
diffusion of innovation. Yet, the measurement of innovation using patent data suffers from 
limitations. The two most severe of these limitations, discussed extensively in the literature, 
are that: (i) not all inventions are patentable and not all patentable inventions are patented; 
and (ii) the value of patents varies widely and the majority of patents is worthless. We refer 
the reader to the original works by Jefferson (1929), Merton (1935), Pavitt (1985) and 
Griliches (1990) for in-depth discussions of these issues.  
 
 This paper focuses on a third limitation, which is the selection bias that arises from 
the way patents are counted. It is common practice to count patents at a single patent office to 
assess firms’ innovation output (henceforth referred to as the ‘single-office count’). A close 
look at a random sample of 20 scientific articles that use patent data, which were published 
recently in general economic and management journals as well as field journals, reveals that 
the overwhelming majority of studies rely on a single office count. However, this practice 
may result in selection bias since firms have the option of filing patents anywhere in the 
world. This is particularly true in Europe, where two overlapping patent offices coexist. In 
addition to filing patents at their national patent office, companies have the option of filing 
patents at the European Patent Office (EPO). Companies that target an international market 
may also file their patents at the World Intellectual Property Office (WIPO) in Geneva, at the 
US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), or in any other jurisdiction. As long as firms’ 
filing decisions are random, the single-office count is a noisy proxy of the full patent count 
(i.e. the count that encompasses patents from all possible patent offices). However, as soon as 
systematic factors affect decisions to select a given filing route, the single-office count results 
in a selection bias.  
 
Motivated by the tension between the popularity of the single office count and the 
threat of a selection bias, the objective of this paper is twofold. First, we exploit a novel 
dataset of patent applications to study whether the single-office count biases econometric 
estimates of innovation production functions. Innovation production functions, which relate a 
firm’s inventive input to its output, are a key object of analysis in the innovation literature. 
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Using data on Belgian patenting firms, we find evidence of a selection bias. Second, we 
propose a simple way to test the existence of bias when the econometrician observes patents 
at only one patent office. We apply our methodology to the sample of Belgian firms to 
demonstrate its usefulness. The test, which uses information that is readily available to most 
researchers, successfully spots variables that are subject to a selection bias. It should be of 
interest to a wide audience given its ease of use and the popularity of the single-office count 
among innovation scholars. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section surveys current practices in the 
way to count patents to estimate innovation production functions. Section 3 explains the 
proposed methodology to detect a selection bias and section 4 presents the econometric 
framework. The data is described in section 5 and the results in section 6. Implications 
regarding data collection and the estimation methodology are presented in section 7, together 
with concluding remarks. 
 
 
2. Measuring innovation with patent data: from theory to practice 
 
Patent data are used in various ways and the appropriate patent indicator necessarily depends 
on the research objective. Here, our focus is on building a patent indicator to estimate 
innovation production functions, a popular object of analysis in the innovation literature. 
Innovation – or patent – production functions relate firms’ research inputs such as R&D 
expenditures to their patented output. They have attracted considerable attention in the 
literature, dating back to Scherer (1965), and have been used, amongst other things, to study 
the occurrence of innovation (e.g. Stoneman, 1979; Aghion et al., 2005; Correa, 2012); to 
study the innovation process and the effectiveness of innovation policies (e.g. Jaffe, 1986; 
Cincera, 1997; Czarnitzki et al., 2007); or as an intermediate step to study the determinants of 
firm productivity (e.g. Pakes and Griliches, 1984; Crépon et al., 1998). 
 
A patent provides protection only in the country in which it is filed. As a result, firms 
that want to protect their invention in different countries must file a patent in each relevant 
national patent office. The first patent describing the invention is called the ‘priority filing’, 
while the subsequent patents extending the protection in other jurisdictions are called ‘second 
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filings’. We use the terms ‘priority filing’ and ‘priority patent application’ interchangeably. 
The priority patent application is usually filed at the home patent office, although it could be 
filed at another patent office (the most popular being the USPTO, the EPO and the WIPO). 
Because companies have a variety of patenting routes available to them, the patent count 
should theoretically include all priority patent applications filed anywhere in the world, 
regardless of the patent office of application. This global count of priority filings is explained 
in greater detail in de Rassenfosse et al. (2011).  
 
In practice, however, the operationalization frequently departs from this ideal 
situation. In particular, the count of patents is usually limited to a count at one reference 
office, usually the national patent office or the EPO for European firms. We studied a random 
sample of 20 papers that estimate patent production functions on European data and that were 
published in the recent past in general economic and management journals as well as in field 
journals (see in Table 5 in Appendix). We find that 75 per cent of the papers rely on the 
single office count, and the EPO is taken as the reference office in most of these instances. 
Surprisingly, very little information on the patent indicators is usually provided. In particular, 
the priority status of the patent documents (priority filings or second filings) is discussed in 
only two cases. Limiting the count to patents filed at one reference office is a simple and 
convenient way to count patents. It is, however, necessarily prone to measurement errors 
since only a fraction of the total patented output is observed. This measurement error is a 
random error if it results in an estimate of effect which is equally likely to be above or below 
the true value, and the single-office count is simply a noisy measure of the true count. 
However, non-randomness in the measurement error would lead to a selection that biases the 
estimates of the patent production function. 
 
The question of whether the single office count results in a selection bias has not been 
studied explicitly, although some authors have reported evidence that systematic factors 
affect the decision of filing route. Seip (2010) provides statistical evidence for Dutch 
patenting companies. He reports that 80 per cent of the Dutch companies that filed patents at 
the EPO or the WIPO in 2003–2007 were large companies (more than 200 employees). Yet, 
out of the 5,000 Dutch patent-filing companies, only 6 per cent have more than 200 
employees, suggesting a large selection bias in terms of firm size: large companies are more 
likely than SMEs to file their patents at the EPO or the WIPO. de Rassenfosse and van 
Pottelsberghe (2009) show that the driving force of national and international patents differ. 
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While nationally-filed patents are more reflective of the propensity to patent, international 
patents such as EPO patents are more reflective of the productivity of research (see also 
Azagra et al., 2006). At the patent level, anecdotal evidence of a potential selection bias is 
provided by van Zeebroeck and van Pottelsberghe (2011). Using a large sample of patents 
granted by the EPO between 1990 and 1995, the authors find that firms adapt their filing 
strategies according to the expected value of the patent. Jensen et al. (2011) come to a similar 
conclusion using Australian patents. They report evidence that patents filed by Australian 
inventors at the WIPO are more valuable on average than Australian patents filed at the 
Australian patent office. 
 
In a nutshell, most authors count patents at one office, although this practice could 
induce a selection bias. The next section formalizes the selection bias in the framework of 
innovation production functions and proposes a methodology to detect its presence. 
 
 
3. Testing for a selection bias 
 
Selection bias is a fundamental aspect of empirical research and many statistical remedies 
have been proposed. The most common forms of selection bias include the sample selection 
bias, data censoring and data truncation (see, for example, Tobin, 1958 and Heckman, 1979). 
The selection effect of patent data is of a different nature, such that no standard method can 
be applied.  
 
It is useful to describe the nature of the selection bias using a log-linear specification. 
Let us write the total unobserved patented output for firm i (  
 ) as: 
 
     
     
      
 
where    is an error term and bold letters denote matrices and vectors. The single-office count 
implies that only a subset of the patents is observed. Let    be the firm-specific fraction of the 
total output that is observed at the reference office: 
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The output observed at the reference office is:  
 
              
               
     
             
 
The observed output is an unbiased measure of the true output if    , that is, if no 
systematic factor affects the choice of the filing route.  
 
To detect the presence of a selection bias, the econometrician should test whether    
is random, i.e. to test whether the decision to file patents at the reference office is not affected 
by elements of x. Unfortunately, since    is not observed, direct inference is not possible. The 
solution involves using information on the structural form of    to test for randomness. 
Patents observed at the reference office are of two types: priority filings, which are directly 
filed at the reference office; and second filings, which are filed at the reference office at a 
later stage. We can thus express    in a generic way as: 
 
     
  (    
 )  
  
 
where   
 
 is the proportion of priority patent applications among total priority patent 
applications that were filed at the reference office and   
  is the proportion of priority patent 
applications not filed at the reference office that are nevertheless observed at the reference 
office as second filings. We call   
 
 and   
  the ‘components’ of   . The variable    depends 
on x when at least one of the two components depends on x. In this case, the following ratio: 
 
 ̃  
  
 
  
  (    
 )  
 
 
 
also depends on x. This ratio is the proportion of priority filings at the reference office 
relative to total filings at the reference office (i.e. priority filings + second filings) and its 
exact value is usually known to the econometrician.  
 
Hence, a simple way of testing the presence of selection bias involves evaluating 
whether  ̃  is correlated with x. If  ̃  is significantly correlated with x, it is likely that there is 
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a selection bias. Conversely, if  ̃  is not correlated with x, it is likely that there is no selection 
bias. One can distinguish four general cases. First, if both components are independent of x, 
there is no selection bias and  ̃  is not correlated with x. Second, if one component depends 
on x but not the other, there is a selection bias and  ̃  is unambiguously correlated with x. 
Third, when both components increase (or decrease) with x, there is a selection bias but the 
overall effect of x on  ̃  is ambiguous. Even though it is likely that  ̃  will be correlated with 
x, there is a possibility that a change in the numerator is exactly offset by a similar change in 
the denominator. This occurs if: 
 
  
 
  
       
    
      
  
  
      
     
   
 1 
 
In that particular scenario,  ̃  is not correlated with x but    depends on x and there is 
selection bias. Fourth, when one component increases with x and the other decreases with x, 
there is not necessarily a selection bias but  ̃  is unambiguously correlated with x. There is no 
selection bias if: 
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but  ̃  is correlated with x. To sum up, if  ̃  is not correlated with x, there is no selection bias 
unless Equation 1 is satisfied. If  ̃  is correlated with x, there is a selection bias unless 
Equation 2 is satisfied. As a general rule, a significant effect of x on  ̃  would suggest the 
presence of a selection bias. Inversely, the selection bias can be ruled out if x is not correlated 
with  ̃ . However, since the individual components are not observed, this approach is not 
infallible.  
 
 Note that another, similar, way of detecting the presence of selection bias involves 
comparing each coefficient of the patent production function estimated with priority filings at 
the reference office, with the corresponding coefficient estimated with total filings (priority 
filings + second filings) at the reference office. Equality of coefficients would suggest that 
there is no selection bias. It is useful to estimate the determinants of  ̃  directly for two 
reasons. First, this approach makes the pitfalls more apparent, in particular regarding the fact 
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that the two components can depend on x even though no correlation is observed (Equation 
1). Second, this approach is also easier to implement since one statistical test is needed for all 
the variables in x instead of one statistical test for each variable in x. The results of the one-
to-one test of equality of coefficients will nevertheless also be reported in the empirical 
exercise. 
 
Three additional comments are in order. First, the methodology detects the presence 
of a selection bias but is silent on the direction and the extent of the bias. As long as the 
output is observed at only one patent office, it is not possible to correct for the selection bias. 
Second, among the three patent counts available at one office (priority filings, second filings, 
and priority filings + second filings), the count of second filings is likely to be the least 
accurate. This is because it is prone to the two sources of errors:   
 
 and   
 . Second, the 
count of all patents at one office (priority filings + second filings) is likely to give more 
accurate estimates than the count of priority filings. The addition of second filings mitigates 
the potential bias induced by priority filings because the number of second filings that can be 
observed depends negatively on the number of priority filings already observed at the 
reference office. However, the count of all patents is not always more accurate than the count 
of priority filings since the possibility exists that the addition of second filings will reinforce 
the bias. As a result, it is good practice to report estimates of the patent production function 
with various counts (say priority filings and total filings) to show the sensibility of the 
parameters, together with the estimation of the variable  ̃ . 
 
 
4. Econometric framework 
 
The empirical analysis proceeds in two steps. First, patent production functions are estimated 
with multiple patent counts to explore the presence of a selection bias. Second, we test 
whether the variable  ̃  detects the selection bias.  
 
Patent production functions are estimated as Poisson such that: 
 
 [   |      ]     (   
     )
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where     is the number of patents for firm i at time t,     is the vector of observable 
covariates,          (   
  ), the term    is an unobservable individual firm-specific effect 
reflecting any permanent difference in the level of patents across firms. A popular estimation 
for count data models with fixed effects is the Poisson conditional maximum likelihood 
estimator proposed by Hausman et al. (1984). However, consistency of the estimator relies on 
the strict exogeneity assumption of    . This assumption is likely to be violated with patent 
production functions, because the patenting of an innovation may call for further R&D. We 
adopt the estimator proposed by Blundell et al. (1999), which relaxes the strict exogeneity 
assumption (see also Blundell et al., 2002). The fixed effect is approximated with the log of 
the pre-sample mean of the patent series, i.e. it reflects the patent practices and the entry-level 
knowledge stock of the firm. A dummy NO_PRE_PAT that takes the value of 1 if the firm 
had no patents in the pre-sample period is added to capture the quasi-missing value in the log 
of patents. Recent studies that apply this estimation strategy include Uchida and Cook (2007), 
Lach and Schankerman (2008) and Czarnitzki et al. (2009).  
Three patent counts are used for the purpose of the analysis. The first,   , is the ‘true’ 
count of priority patent applications filed worldwide (the variable   
  in section 3). It is 
usually not observed by the econometrician. Estimates with this benchmark count will be 
compared with estimates with single-office counts to study the effect of selection bias. The 
second,   , is the count of priority filings at the EPO. The third,      , is the count of 
priority and second filings at the EPO (the variable    in section 3). Although this count 
mixes patents of varying nature, it takes into account a broader set of patents, thereby 
potentially limiting the selection bias. 
 
The measure for the single-office bias (variable  ̃  in section 3) is estimated as a 
Bernoulli pseudo-maximum likelihood following Papke and Wooldridge (1996) to account 
for the fact that the variable  ̃ is bounded between 0 and 1: 
 
  [ ̃  |   ]       
    4 
 
where h    is a link function satisfying                such as the logistic link 
function.  
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5. The Data 
 
5.1 Data sources 
 
Three databases were merged together for the purpose of the analysis. The first is the 
biannual R&D survey by the Government of the Flemish Community in Belgium. Three 
waves were used: 2004, 2006 and 2008, providing annual data on R&D-related variables for 
the period 2002–2008. The second is the Belfirst database by Bureau van Dijk, which 
provides yearly information on balance sheets and income statements. Finally, the Patstat 
database by the EPO (April 2009 version) was used to collect data on patents. Because patent 
applications are published (hence observable) 18 months after the filing date, the data was 
collected up to 2007. 
 
The novelty of the patent data is a key aspect of our paper. The construction of the 
patent indicator follows two logical steps: all the patent applications from inventions made in 
Belgium are identified and are then merged with the R&D survey data. For the purpose of the 
analysis, it is particularly important to observe the population of priority filings invented in 
Belgium. It is done by identifying all the priority patent applications filed worldwide by 
inventors living in Belgium, using the counting methodology described in depth in de 
Rassenfosse et al. (2011).
1
 The name of the firms actually applying for the patent (the 
‘applicant’ in jargon) was then manually harmonized and matched with data from the R&D 
questionnaire. 
 
The sample is composed of all the companies that have at least one patent application 
in the period 2002–2007 and that are in at least two waves of the R&D survey. It contains 
429 observations on 95 distinct firms and is thus slightly unbalanced. 
 
5.2 The dependent variables 
 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the patent counts. Approximately 45 per cent of the 
priority filings by Belgian inventors over the period 2002–2007 were filed at the EPO (row 
                                                          
1
 The ‘inventor’ criterion reflects the origin of the inventive activity and ensures a good match with statistics on 
R&D, which specifically relate to the R&D expenditures within a country (OECD, 2009). 
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(a)). This is a very large share in comparison with the European average of less than 10 per 
cent over roughly the same period (de Rassenfosse et al., 2011). Interestingly, the Belgian 
patent office receives less patent applications than the EPO: only 22 per cent of the priority 
patent applications by Belgian inventors are actually filed in Belgium (column (b) - column 
(a)). If both priority and second filings at the EPO are counted, the share of patents identified 
rises to around 85 per cent (row (e)).  
 
Table 1: Proportion of patents identified 
Number of patents: 507 
Priority filings  
(a) EP [  ] 0.45 
(b) EP + BE 0.67 
(c) EP + BE + US 0.73 
(d) ALL [  ] 1.00 
Priority filings + second filings  
(e) EP [     ] 0.85 
(f) EP + BE 0.93 
(g) EP + BE + US 0.96 
Notes: Figures computed at the patent level. ‘BE’ stands for the Belgian patent office, ‘EP’ for the EPO and 
‘US’ for the USPTO.  
 
Figures from Table 1 are computed using patent-level information and therefore hide 
any heterogeneity in the behavior of firms. Figure 1 reports firm-level statistics on the use of 
the EPO by Belgian patenting firms. As shown, 37.5 per cent of patenting firms in our sample 
file all of their priority patent applications at the EPO; 42.5 per cent of firms never file their 
priority applications at the EPO; and the remaining 20 per cent file some but not all their 
priority filings at the EPO. Among those that never file their priority filings at the EPO, 31 
per cent do not file their second filings at the EPO. It follows that approximately 13 per cent 
of the Belgian patenting firms never file their patents at the EPO (31 per cent of 42.5 per 
cent) and are therefore excluded from the single office count. By contrast, the single office 
count provides accurate information for about 61.5 per cent of firms if both priority filings 
and second filings are counted (37.5 per cent of firms that file all their priority patent 
applications at the EPO, plus 0.425*0.35 = 16 per cent of firms that have no priority filings at 
the EPO but all their second filings at the EPO, plus 0.20*0.40 = 8 per cent of firms whose 
patents reach the EPO through a mix of priority filings and second filings). Partial 
information is gleaned for the remaining 25.5 per cent of firms. 
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Figure 1: Share of Belgian companies that file their patent applications at the EPO 
 
 
To sum up, 85 per cent of all patents by Belgian firms will eventually end up at the 
EPO (column (e) of Table 1), such that the single-office count seems a reasonable 
methodological choice. However, this high proportion masks important disparities across 
firms since partial or no information is collected for almost 40 per cent of firms (respectively 
25.5 per cent and 13 per cent), as shown in Figure 1. The comparable figure is certainly much 
higher in most other European countries, which rely on the EPO to a lesser extent. In this 
respect, the Belgian case is a strong test of our claim. If a selection bias affects estimates for 
Belgian data, it is very likely that it will also affect estimates for data from other countries. 
 
5.3 Covariates 
 
We include the number of full-time equivalent employees (EMP) as a measure of firm size. 
The ratio of tangible assets (CAPITAL) over the number of employees is a measure of the 
capital intensity of the firm. Similarly, the ratio of total R&D expenditures (RD) to the 
number of employees is an indication of the R&D intensity of the firm. Age (AGE) is defined 
as the number of years the firm exists. We also include a measure of the intensity of 
competition (COMP). It is an ordinal variable that takes a value between 1 and 3 if the main 
competitors of the firm are located in Belgium (1), in Europe (2), or worldwide (3). Finally, 
the regression controls for 13 industry and five time dummies. 
None
42.5 %
Some
20 %
All
37.5 %
None
31 %
Some
31 %
All
38 %
None
50 %
Some
All
40 %
Share of companies  that file all, some or none 
of their priority filings at the EPO
Among these, share of companies that file
all, some or none of their remaining priority 
filings at the EPO as second filings
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
  Min Mean Max Std. Dev. 
EMP (FTE)  4 592 5,685 942 
CAPITAL (‘000)  16 35,051 2,253,238 159,204 
RD (‘000)  0 20,718 1,153,000 115,943 
AGE  1 33 168 29 
COMP (o)  1 2.59 3 0.60 
Notes: N= 429. ‘FTE’ stands for full-time equivalent, ‘‘000’ for thousand Euros. ‘(o)’ indicates an ordinal 
variable.  
 
Table 2 provides an overview of the descriptive statistics. Firms in the sample are 
relatively large: the average firm has 592 employees and EUR 35 million in tangible assets, 
spends EUR 21 million in R&D, and is 33 years.  
 
 
6. Results 
 
Table 3 presents estimates of the patent production function for various dependent variables, 
as well as estimates of the single-office bias.  
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Table 3: Estimates of the patent production function and the selection bias 
  (1)  (2a) (2b)  (3a) (3b)  (4a) (4b) 
Equation:  3  3  3  4 
Dep. variable:                  ̃ 
            
ln(EMP)  0.477***  0.473*** N  0.473*** N  0.0240 N 
  (0.094)  (0.096)   (0.102)   (0.209)  
ln(CAP/EMP)  -0.222**  -0.289** N  -0.257** N  0.369 N 
  (0.102)  (0.147)   (0.114)   (0.382)  
ln(RD/EMP)  0.287***  0.597*** Y  0.240*** N  0.990** Y 
  (0.081)  (0.127)   (0.093)   (0.448)  
ln(AGE)  -0.055  -0.394** Y  -0.053 N  -0.515* Y 
  (0.111)  (0.158)   (0.135)   (0.273)  
COMP  0.297  -0.124 N  0.632** Y  -1.549* Y 
  (0.223)  (0.300)   (0.299)   (0.938)  
PRE_PAT  0.354**  -0.146   0.458***     
  (0.165)  (0.256)   (0.172)     
NO_PRE_PAT  0.219  -0.518   0.324     
  (0.173)  (0.281)   (0.198)     
NO_PATENT          -37.72***  
          (0.479)  
Constant  -4.878***  -3.759***   -5.862***   3.536  
  (0.920)  (1.163)   (1.109)   (4.816)  
Industry dummies  Y***  Y***   Y***   Y***  
Year dummies  Y***  Y***   Y***   Y  
R
2 
 0.58  0.56   0.55   0.81  
Notes: N = 429. The econometric method is a Poisson maximum likelihood in columns (1), (2a) and (3a), and a 
Bernoulli pseudo-maximum likelihood in column (4a). Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level in 
parentheses. R
2
 is computed as the square of the correlation coefficient between the dependent variable and its 
predicted value. ‘Y’ indicates that the coefficient is different from the corresponding ‘true’ coefficient at the 10% 
probability threshold. ‘N’ indicates that the coefficient is not significantly different from the corresponding ‘true’ 
coefficient. 
 
The coefficients in column (1), obtained with the worldwide patent count   , should be 
compared with the coefficients estimated with the single office count of priority filings in 
column (2a) and the coefficients estimated with the single office count of total filings 
(priority filings + second filings) in column (3a). Column (2b) and (3b) report the results of 
the Chow test for difference in coefficients. A value ‘Y’ indicates that the coefficient is 
different from the corresponding ‘true’ coefficient at the 10% probability threshold. For 
instance, ln(AGE) takes the value ‘Y’ in column (2b) because the coefficient estimated with 
the count of priority filings at the EPO  is statistically different from the coefficient in column 
(1).  
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Looking at column (1), firm age and the intensity of competition are not associated 
with differences in innovation outcomes. The picture looks different if the count is limited to 
a single office, as shown in columns (2a) and (3a). Depending on the patent indicator, firm 
age and the intensity of competition are significant determinants of the patent count, 
seemingly suggesting that young firms and firms evolving in a more competitive environment 
are more ‘innovative’ than others. The true explanation, however, is different: these firms are 
simply more likely to file their patents at the EPO, reflecting a selection bias. A third bias 
occurs with respect to R&D intensity, which is significantly higher in column (2a) than in 
column (1).  
 
Our proposed test, which uses only information available at the EPO, is reported in 
the last two columns. The estimation of the variable  ̃ is presented in column (4a). The 
coefficients associated with the R&D intensity, age and competition variables are 
significantly different from zero, suggesting that the methodology successfully identifies the 
presence of a selection bias. The result of a one-to-one test of difference in coefficients 
between column (2b) and column (3b) is reported in column (4b) and confirms the presence 
of bias. Thus, our results suggest that the selection bias can be detected even though the 
econometrician observes patents at only one patent office. 
 
In a nutshell, it seems that the variable  ̃ contains information that allows detection of a 
selection bias. Two elements must be emphasized. First, both the count of priority filings and 
total filings are biased, suggesting that researchers should estimate and report regression 
results for both counts. Second, the methodology has allowed successful detection of bias and 
has not been affected by the risk of false negatives and false positives, as discussed in section 
3.  
 
6.1 Additional considerations 
 
The patent production functions were estimated with a negative binomial regression model 
with no change to the results. Similarly, the variable  ̃ was estimated with a simple OLS 
regression and the biases were successfully identified. We now explore two alternative 
approaches to control for selection bias. The first involves estimating zero-inflated Poisson 
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regression models. The second involves weighting each patent observed by a measure of its 
value. 
 
 Zero-inflated Poisson regression models have been used to account for the fact that 
patenting is a rare event, particularly among small innovative firms. The zero-inflated 
Poisson distribution, introduced by Lambert (1992), is a mixture between a degenerate 
distribution at zero with probability p and a Poisson distribution with probability 1-p. The 
aim is to increase the probability mass at zero to account for the greater occurrence of zero 
outcome. Since the selection bias will exacerbate the occurrence of zero observations, one 
can wonder whether a zero-inflated Poisson regression model can be used to control for some 
of the effects of the selection bias. Estimates are presented in columns (1), (2a) and (3a) of 
Table 4. The upper panel presents estimates of the parameters of the Poisson distribution, 
while the lower panel models the probability of having a zero outcome (the inflation 
equation). Thus, a variable with a positive coefficient in the lower panel increases the 
probability of observing no patent. Looking at the results, it seems that the inflation equation 
does not eliminate the biases. This is apparent in columns (2b) and (3b), which report the 
results of the Chow test for a difference in coefficients with column (1). As compared with 
the simple Poisson regression, the zero-inflated Poisson has made matters worse for priority 
filings. 
  
Value-weighted counts are another possible way of removing the effect of selection 
bias, although their use in empirical studies remains the exception rather than the rule. For 
instance, only 25 per cent of the articles surveyed in section 2 use a value-weighted count. In 
theory, value-weighted patent indicators can mitigate the selection bias if more valuable 
patents are more likely to be filed at the reference office: since a low weight is given to low-
value patents, which are also less likely to be observed at the reference office, the single 
office value-weighted count gets closer to the ‘true’ value-weighted count. There are three 
main measures of patent value: the number of years the patent has been maintained in force 
(useful life), the number of citations it has received (citations), and the number of countries in 
which it was filed (family size).
2
 The first measure, useful life, is available only for patents 
that were filed 20 or more years ago, corresponding to the maximum number of years a 
patent can be held in force. For patents that are less than 20 years of age and still in force, the 
                                                          
2
 We refer the reader to van Zeebroeck (2011) for a recent review of patent value indicators. 
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useful life will necessarily be truncated. Since our analysis uses recent data, this value 
variable would be severely truncated. The second measure, citations, raises practical hurdles 
in our context as it is not possible to build a proper benchmark. Patent citation practices vary 
greatly across patent offices and their interpretation is often office-specific (see e.g. Harhoff 
et al., 2008). As a result, it makes little sense to weight the exhaustive patent count    with 
the citations received across patent offices. In addition, the information on citations is not 
exhaustive in the Patstat database and is missing for some patent offices. The third measure, 
family size, is more appealing. It involves weighting each patent by the number of members 
in the patent family. Since the family may spread worldwide, this measure necessitates 
observing the whole population of patents. A researcher that is able to compute a family-
weighted count is thus theoretically also able to build the exhaustive patent count. In other 
words, a proper value-weighted count cannot be computed if the researcher does not observe 
patents worldwide, precisely when our test should be used. 
 
Nevertheless, we report family-weighted estimates in columns (4), (5a) and (6a) of 
Table 4 for the sake of completeness. The effect of a selection bias is still observed for both 
counts, as suggested by columns (5b) and (6b). Interestingly, the bias seems smaller in size 
than the original, non-value-weighted, estimates, at least as far as total filings at the EPO are 
concerned. Three cautionary comments are in order. First, this methodology works only if the 
reference office attracts the most valuable patents. This is likely to be the case with the EPO, 
but not with national patent offices. If an office attracts the least valuable patents, then the use 
of a value indicator further distorts the count. Second, there are reasons for believing that the 
methodology will not work for many other countries. As described in section 3, Belgium has 
a very high share of patents that eventually ends up at the EPO (around 85 per cent). This 
situation is particularly favorable since the patents not observed at the EPO are likely to be of 
much lower value. Third, as already noted, a researcher that has enough data to compute a 
proper, value-weighted count has a priori also enough data to compute the exhaustive count. 
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Table 4: Patent production functions estimated with different specifications 
 (1) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b)  (4) (5a) (5b) (6a) (6b) 
Dep. Variable:                  ̃   ̃    ̃    ̃  
ln(EMP) 0.439*** 0.713*** Y 0.470*** N  0.397*** 0.413*** N 0.394*** N 
 (0.080) (0.102)  (0.076)   (0.102) (0.121)  (0.103)  
ln(CAP/EMP) -0.305** -0.542*** N -0.477*** Y  -0.152 -0.340 N -0.148 N 
 (0.128) (0.159)  (0.010)   (0.133) (0.242)  (0.144)  
ln(RD/EMP) 0.152** 0.552*** Y 0.119 N  0.192 0.653*** Y 0.160 Y 
 (0.069) (0.128)  (0.086)   (0.117) (0.139)  (0.123)  
ln(AGE) -0.003 -0.355*** Y -0.0323 N  0.200 -0.184 Y 0.250 N 
 (0.092) (0.113)  (0.097)   (0.188) (0.202)  (0.213)  
COMP 0.527** -0.270 Y 0.630** N  0.589* -0.368 Y 0.801** Y 
 (0.212) (0.271)  (0.252)   (0.309) (0.392)  (0.348)  
Inflation Equation:           
ln(EMP) -0.125 0.853  -0.0746        
 (0.120) (0.595)  (0.118)        
ln(CAP/EMP) -0.123 -0.779**  -0.191        
 (0.169) (0.389)  (0.165)        
ln(RD/EMP) -0.254** -0.0295  -0.196        
 (0.102) (0.205)  (0.133)        
ln(AGE) 0.397* 0.101  0.459*        
 (0.218) (0.280)  (0.268)        
COMP 0.670* -0.511  0.346        
 (0.378) (0.608)  (0.455)        
R
2 
0.57 0.58  0.54   0.63 0.45  0.61  
Notes: Estimates based on 429 observations. Industry dummies, time dummies and pre-sample fixed effects 
included. ‘ ̃’ indicates that x is weighted by its family size. R2 is computed as the square of the correlation 
coefficient between the dependent variable and its predicted value. A value ‘Y’ indicates that the coefficient is 
different from the corresponding ‘true’ coefficient at the 10% probability threshold. ‘N’ indicates that the 
coefficient is not significantly different from the corresponding ‘true’ coefficient. 
 
 
7. Discussion and concluding remarks 
 
This paper takes a close look at the widespread practice in innovation studies of using one 
single office of reference for counting patents. Its contribution is twofold. First, it uses a 
novel dataset of the whole population of patents filed by Belgian firms to show that the 
single-office count of patents results in biased estimates of innovation production functions. 
Second, it proposes a simple way to test for the existence of a selection bias. The 
methodology involves estimating the determinants of the proportion  ̃ of priority patent 
applications filed at the reference office among total patent applications at the reference 
office. The empirical application suggests that the test successfully spots coefficients that are 
affected by selection bias. 
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Two implications for research follow from the results presented in this paper. First, 
estimates based on a single-office count of patents should be treated with skepticism. For 
instance, the empirical application uses a variable that captures the competitive environment 
of the firm. While we are cautious not to interpret our results in any causal manner, we note 
that the type of patent indicator that is chosen affects the findings. In particular, the effect of 
competition on innovation is observed with international, high-value patents but not with 
total patents. Given that empirical studies have not generated clear conclusions about the 
relationship between innovation and competition (Gilbert, 2006), particular attention should 
be paid to the patent indicators that are used in future studies. This statement is true more 
generally for all variables that are likely to be affected by selection bias. Second, on a 
methodological level, the count of patents should be global to avoid a selection bias, and not 
limited to a single patent office. If the researcher is limited to a single office, then good 
practice would involve reporting estimates of patent production functions for both priority 
filings, and total filings (i.e. priority filings + second filings) to show the sensibility of the 
parameters, together with estimates of the determinants of the variable  ̃. If the focal variable 
does not affect the variable  ̃, then our results suggest that the econometrician can be 
reasonably confident that the coefficient associated with the focal variable is not biased by 
the patent indicator used. Note that in countries such as the United Kingdom or the United 
States, the national patent office attracts more than 90 per cent of priority filings by national 
inventors (de Rassenfosse et al., 2011). For these countries, restricting the count to patents 
filed at the home office is thus a sensible methodological choice. However, counting patents 
at the EPO would result in a severe restriction of patents. At the very least, our results suggest 
that researchers should think carefully about what patents they count. 
 
This study also comes with a number of caveats and possibilities for further research, 
which we briefly discuss. First, it should be noted that the variable  ̃ does not perfectly 
capture the selection bias. In particular, there are well-defined conditions under which i) the 
focal variable is not correlated with  ̃ even though there is a selection bias, and ii) the focal 
variable is correlated with  ̃ even though there is no selection bias. Although we did not 
come across such cases in the empirical analysis, the possibility of false negatives and false 
positives exists at least in theory. Second, the test requires that the priority status of the patent 
document is available. This information is available in most databases either directly, or 
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indirectly by looking at the priorities claimed by the patent document. By definition, a patent 
that does not claim any priority is itself a priority. If the information on claimed priorities is 
not directly available in the patent database used by the researcher, it is still possible to 
identify priority filings by comparing the filing date with the priority date. If both dates are 
similar, the chance is high that the patent is a priority patent application. Thus, the priority 
status of the document can be collected at a low additional cost. Finally, even though a very 
high share of Belgian patents eventually ends up at the EPO, the effect of a selection bias was 
clearly visible in the data. In this respect, the Belgian case provides a very strong test of our 
claim: since a selection bias affects estimates for Belgian data, it is also very likely to affect 
estimates for data from other countries. Nevertheless, it would be useful to perform a similar 
exercise with data on firms from other countries to confirm the generality of our proposed 
methodology. 
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 Appendix 
 
Table 5: Overview of patent indicators used in the literature 
 Geographic area Time period Cross-section 
vs. panel 
Sample size Office(s) PF vs. SF Application  
vs. grant 
Value 
Cincera (1997) 
 Worldwide 1983–1991 Panel 181 firms EPO Undisclosed A N 
Ernst (1998) 
 Europe and Japan 1990–1994 Cross-section 25 firms EPO Undisclosed A Y 
Brouwer and Kleinknecht (1999) 
 The Netherlands 1992; 1998 Cross-section 148 firms EPO Undisclosed A N 
Meliciani (2000) 
 OECD 1973–1999 Panel 180 country-sectors USPTO Undisclosed G N 
Furman et al. (2002) 
 OECD 1973–1996 Panel 17 countries USPTO Undisclosed G N 
Fritsch (2002) 
 Europe 1995–1998 Cross-section 707 firms Undisclosed Undisclosed A N 
Bottazzi and Peri (2003) 
 Europe 1977–1995 Cross-section 86 regions EPO Undisclosed G N 
Aghion et al. (2005) 
 U.K. 1973–1994 Panel 311 firms USPTO Undisclosed G Y 
Salomon and Shaver (2005) 
 Spain 1990-1997 Panel 3,060 firms Spanish PO, EPO Undisclosed A N 
Ulku (2007) 
 OECD 1981–1997 Panel 68 country-sectors USPTO Undisclosed G N 
Carayol (2007) 
 France 1995–2000 Cross-section 941 scholars French PO, EPO, PCT PF & SF A Y 
Mariani and Romanelli (2007) 
 Europe 1988–1998 Cross-section 793 inventors EPO Undisclosed A Y 
Tappeiner et al. (2008) 
 Europe 1999 Cross-section  51 regions  EPO Undisclosed A N 
Czarnitzki et al. (2009) 
 Belgium 1993–2003 Panel 122 firms  EPO Undisclosed A N 
Akçomak and ter Weel (2009) 
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 Europe 1990; 2000 Cross-section 102 regions EPO Undisclosed A N 
Hoekman et al. (2009) 
 Europe 1988–2001 Cross-section 1,316 regions EPO Undisclosed Undisclosed N 
Buesa et al. (2010) 
 Europe 1995–2001 Panel 146 regions EPO Undisclosed Undisclosed N 
Picci (2010) 
 Worldwide 1990–2005 Panel 42 countries NPOs PF A N 
Fornahl et al. (2011) 
 Germany 1997–2004 Panel 129 firms EPO, PCT Undisclosed Undisclosed N 
Rentocchini (2011) 
 Worldwide 2000–2003 Panel 979 firms EPO  Undisclosed A Y 
Notes: ‘PF’ stands for ‘priority filings’; ‘SF’ for ‘second filings’; ‘PO’ for ‘patent office’; and ‘NPO’ for ‘national patent office’. 
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